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Abstract  
Social media plays a significant role in rapid propagation of information when disasters occur. Among the four 
phases of disaster management life cycle: prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery, this paper focuses on 
the use of social media during the response phase. It empirically examines the use of microblogging platforms by 
Emergency Response Organisations (EROs) during extreme natural events, and distinguishes the use of Twitter by 
EROs from digital volunteers during a fire hazard occurred in Australia state of Victoria in early February 2014. 
We analysed 7,982 tweets on this event. While traditionally theories such as World System Theory and Institutional 
Theory focus on the role of powerful institutional information outlets, we found that platforms like Twitter challenge 
such notion by sharing the power between large institutional (e.g. EROs) and smaller non-institutional players 
(e.g. digital volunteers) in the dissemination of disaster information. Our results highlight that both large EROs 
and individual digital volunteers proactively used Twitter to disseminate and distribute fire related information. 
We also found that the contents of tweets were more informative than directive, and that while the total number of 
messages posted by top EROs were more than the non-institutional ones, whereas non-institutions exceeded on 
tweets and sharing of the tweets.  
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Disasters are complex in nature, which may have disproportionate effects at varying speed. Information 
exchange is pivotal during the disaster management processes (i.e., prevention, preparedness, response, and 
recovery), particularly in the response phase, as the dynamic and complex nature of the extreme natural disasters 
increases the rate of communication between stakeholders (Abedin et al. 2014).  
Social media sites have been increasingly used by government organizations for communication with 
citizens to enhance a community’s capacity in the face of disasters (Polet et al. 2017). Recent studies indicate that 
social media platforms support various activities within the disaster management cycle. For example, Houston et 
al. (2015) propose a functional framework for guiding the use of social media for disaster related research. This 
framework provides guidance on the use of various types of social media tools that can be used to perform a variety 
of disaster related activities ranging from preparing and receiving disaster preparedness information to disaster 
presentation initiatives and warnings as well as predicting disasters. Twitter, in particular, has gone beyond simply 
a social networking tool to a strategic communication tool during disastrous events all over the world (Lee et al. 
2015). It has been used in pushing Toyota recalls in 2010 (Stieglitz and Krüger 2011) and Seattle Café shooting 
in 2012 (McNerthney 2012). It also has been used to manage crisis such as Victorian floods (Ehnis and Bunker 
2012), Earthquake of Morgan Hill CA (Crooks et al. 2013), Haiti earthquake (Yates and Paquette 2011), and 
Kenya’s Westgate mall terror attack (Simon et al. 2014).  
Research shows that institutional actors actively use social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook in 
their formal interactions with public through sending them warnings and specific advice or directions (Whitelaw 
and Henson 2014; Erfani et al. 2016). Previous studies on institutional theory suggest that institutions normally 
actively conform to the demands of social media and may develop indirect forms of maintaining control over user-
generated content and the behaviours of social media users (Falls 2013). According to Scott (1995:53), 
“institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. [They] are composed of cultural-
cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide 
stability and meaning to social life”. This perspective is in line with World System Theory (WST) (Wallerstein 
1974), as the theory too promotes the notion that information and news typically flows from powerful outlets to 
minor peripheral information outlets (Barnett 2001). WST theory has roots in the practice of journalism, however 
it has been applied to various disciplines including information systems and management (Golan & Himelboim 
2016), and is a great tool to explain a more traditional perspective on information flow in any system. This theory 
suggests that all players in an information/news dissemination network act within a particular system, and that 
major institutional actors dominate the flow of information/news to non-institutional or minor institutional 
stakeholders.  
Given the widespread use of social media by public, government, and non-government organizations, 
often the traditional perspectives such as those of WST on information dissemination between various stakeholders 
in a network (e.g. a disaster events) have been challenged. For example, in a recent study by Golan and Himelboim 
(2016) it was found that the structure of the information flow on Twitter displays a hierarchical core–periphery 
structure; however non-institutional stakeholders such as individual Twitter users conform less than institutional 
actors such as government organizations to that structure. The above scholars also discovered that while 
traditionally only a small number of formal institutions were supposed to deliver information to their audience, 
non-institutional actors assume the role of bridging news sources and audiences using social media tools and 
platforms. 
While there are many studies in the literature on the use of social media during natural disasters, most of 
them have focused on institutional actors and how major organizations or government authorities use these tools 
to communicate with the people affected by disasters (Lerman 2010).  However, non-government and local 
community members also play a significant role in information dissemination during disasters. For example, Bird 
et al. (2012) investigated the use of social media during the Queensland and Victoria floods in Australia, and found 
that community-initiated Facebook groups play a significant role in helping residents finding their friends and 
family, updating people with real time updates and providing information about the disaster as well as about 
government departments’ activities, and also assisting travelers with information about road closure and necessary 
advices. Their research found that social media is not only a tool for information dissemination, but also a critical 
resource to tap into and utilize informal communications.  
Thus, this paper challenges the predictions of WST and other similar perspectives on the flow of 
information between institutional and non-institutional actors in a given network or system. In particular, this 
paper aims to study the role of non-institutional and informal Twitter account holders in dissemination of disaster 
information. To address this need, we examine how the task of information dissemination was shared between 
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Australian Emergency Response Organisations (EROs) and smaller non-institutional players such as digital 
volunteers and active individual Twitter account holders during Victorian fire hazard in 2014.  
2. SOCIAL MEDIA IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
Unlike traditional information and communication technologies, Social Media platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, Wikis, and SharePoint enable open and online exchange of information via conversation, 
interaction and exchange of user generated contents (Lee et al. 2015; Abedin & Jafarzadeh, 2013). These platforms 
help people to establish connections and links with like-minded people and community members (Simon 2015). 
Social media users can share and discuss their opinions in real time through posts and links. Therefore, social 
media can be used to mobilize and organize communities in order to achieve various types of objectives, and 
update the communities with the most up-to-date information, which might not be available via traditional sources 
(Abedin 2016; Lerman 2010).  
Social media platforms have increasingly been part of disaster response (Sarcevic 2012). These platforms 
which were previously used during disasters and emergencies by general public, are now being utilized by EROs, 
Governments, and non-Governmental organisations to manage disasters. During natural disasters social media 
provides access to relevant and timely information from both official and non-official sources which can help to 
facilitate a feeling of connectedness (Taylor 2012). This provides connectivity to loved ones, and brings comfort 
for the community as well as support and assistance to potentially distressed individuals and populations (Taylor 
2012).  
The utilization of social media for communications during disasters/emergencies was initiated by the 
public before emergency authorities start utilizing it. Apparently, the public wanted to find alternative ways 
(alternative to the unidirectional communication approach) to search and share updated information concerning 
the emergency (Sutton 2008). EROs now utilize social media to engage citizens in the emergency management by 
both disseminating information and accessing information from the public.  
According to Latonero (2010), research on the use of social media during emergencies can be divided 
into two main categories: one that focuses on the ways in which EROs use social media to coordinate activities 
during their response to the event, and the other one that deals with the ways the public and victims share 
information on social media during emergencies. For examples, social media platforms were used to link the public 
with day-to-day, real-time information in preparation to the 2009H1N1 pandemic. A few minutes after the 
Alexandria, Virginia health department tweeted regarding availability and location of vaccines, people rushed to 
the vaccination sites (Merchant 2011). This presents that an integration of social media platforms for preparedness 
activities can facilitate an effective response from EROs as well as the citizens by using familiar platforms during 
an event (Merchant 2011). Since the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, EROs around the world have adopted social media 
as an important additional communication channel to communicate with the public (Bird 2012; Sarcevic 2012).  
3. THE STUDY EVENT 
Being the world’s sixth largest country by area, Australia has got its share of natural disasters. It has a 
long and dreadful history of natural disasters such as bushfires, floods, severe storms, and landslides (Ahmad 
2011). In recent years, Australian government agencies have shown a significant interest in the use of social media, 
particularly Twitter, for interaction with general public during emergency response (Whitelaw and Henson 2014; 
Alam and Walker 2011; Kavanaugha et al. 2011). The growth of Twitter users in Australia resembles the growth 
of Twitter users in many other countries including the United States (Whitelaw and Henson 2014).   
Ehnis and Bunker (2012) found that Queensland Police Service (QPS) used microblogging services to 
interact with public during the 2011 Queensland flood disaster. Being proactive, QPS created an online community 
of followers before the flooding occurred. QPS conducted an extensive trial use of media technologies – Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube, in which they wanted to establish a new channel for a two-way communication and 
collaboration between QPS and the public. These social media services were used to disseminate information and 
warning out to their following communities and general public. The “likes” and comments from the community 
indicated that the community did not only read information, but also seek interaction with the serving agencies 
with offer of help and assistance. But Ehnis and Bunker (2012) concluded it is still unclear that if the presence of 
government institutions on social media platform was effective in recent disasters.  
In February 2014, Victoria confronted its worst bushfires since 2009 Black Saturday. A series of blazes, 
caused by the lightning strikes lit up the state near the end of January. The most serious bursts were in and around 
Melbourne in the first week of February, which destroyed three houses in an intense blaze at Warrandyte on the 
city’s north eastern peripheral (SBS 2014). While the bushfire failed to affect power generation directly, around 
12,000 Victorian homes suffered outages due to spikes in demand and damage to power lines. Fires particularly 
at Mickleham and Warrandyte moved fast with the wind change early in the afternoon, opening up new and wider 
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fronts. More than 350 fire fighters and 60 trucks were deployed to battle the fire in Mickleham and Warrandyte, 
whereas a further 126 trucks fought the 3000-hectare fire in Gisborne and nearby Riddells Creek. According to 
the Country Fire Authority’s (CFA) announcement the fires burning near Warrandyte, in Melbourne's outer North 
East, and near Gisborne, North West of the city were eased by 17 of Feb (SBS 2014). No one was killed or seriously 
injured during the Melbourne fire, but many animals were among the casualties of the 333,000-hectare fires1. In 
this event, the emergency authorities and the general public (people on the ground) heavily used Twitter to 
exchange information. Emergency management organizations used Twitter platform to provide up to minute 
information to the people whereas the individuals and social communities used Twitter to learn and forward that 
information by re-tweeting. In the 13 days of the fires, both emergency authorities and people on the ground posted 
around 7,981 tweets about these fires. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION  
Analysing tweets, re-tweets, and mentions is a common practice in the majority of the studies on the use 
of Twitter (Mendoza et al. 2010; Simon et al. 2014; Oh et al. 2013; Crooks et al. 2013). For example Simon et al. 
(2014) investigated tweeting, re-tweeting and mentioning of government officials and security forces accounts 
during a terrorist attack in a shopping mall in Kenya. Such analysis helps to understand how Twitter has been used 
by various stakeholders such as general public, volunteers, media, emergency response organizations and so forth.  
We used R with twitteR, tm, and sna packages which have also been previously used in the literature 
(Butts 2008; Díaz-Uriarte and Andrés 2006), for the collection, storage and analysis of Twitter data on Victoria 
fire. R, as an open source software environment for statistical computing and visualization, is used in conjunction 
with a variety of packages for improved, collection, analysis and storage of data in various areas of research such 
as epidemiological (Chongsuvivatwong 2008), bioinformatics (Heyde et al. 2014), environmental statistics, 
economics, medical and public health application.   
 The R package ‘twitteR’2 is an R based Twitter client which provides an interface to the Twitter web AP, for 
the collection and storage of Twitter data. It has been recognized as a simple and practical way for retrieving 
data from Twitter. It captures public tweets, trending topics and tweets containing a given hashtag, words, and 
user names. After collecting the desired tweets, we extracted their contents by using function twListToDF that 
puts everything in the data frame.  
 R package ‘tm’ has also been used to perform text mining. The structure for managing documents in tm is 
called Corpus referring to a collection of text documents.  
 The R package ‘sna’ is based on network theory for the purpose of analysing social networks consisting of 
nodes representing individual actors within the network.  
Our first step in relation to data collection was to establish a secure and authentic connection with Twitter 
by performing handshake procedures, which includes using ‘ROAuth’ package with ‘twitteR’ package to setup 
credentials in the form of consumer key and secret. Once the connection was completed, the next step was to 
access data by using twitterR. The crawling and data collection occurred between 7 and 14 Feb 2014, which was 
the peak time period of the fire event, and we were able to extract 7,981 tweets created between 20 Jan and 14 Feb 
2014. We used ‘searchTwitter’ function of the ‘twitterR’ package to search and download the tweets, based on the 
relevant hashtags and the accounts of many Australian EROs involved in the response to the event. In addition, 
information about individual users as well as communities and government emergency users’ accounts relevant to 
the fire event were also captured. 
Our preliminary investigation into Twitter posts (i.e., tweets) identified a number of terms and hashtags 
related to the fires. It included ‘victoria bushfire’, ‘bush fire #vicfire’, ‘#firevic’ ‘#firewatch’ and 
‘#southmelbourne’. We used ‘victoria bushfire’, ‘#Vicfire’ and ‘#firevic’ to extract tweets specific to the fire and 
used by both the public and fire authorities to provide and exchange information. Accounts belonged to Australian 
emergency authorities (EROs) were considered formal and valid representatives of state and national level 
government. Therefore, tweets posted by these organizations were considered valuable having impact on the 
population. As outlined in the following section, a social network analysis was then conducted on the data to 
understand the activeness of the EROs and their influence on the followers during the event.  
 






5.1 Demographics findings 
Table 1 shows the list of top EROs involved in the 2014 Victorian bushfire. These EROs have joined 
Twitter as early as 2008, while some others have joined later in 2011 and 2012. The results indicate that all EROs 
have actively been sharing fire related information (updates, warnings and briefs) with the communities. As 
evident in Table 1, all ERO accounts have posted a large number of tweets since the creation of their accounts, 
with @Firewatch_Melb and @Australianwarni posted the highest number of tweets since their establishment.   
Table 1 also indicates that the information provided by the EROs through tweets is trusted by the 
individuals, as EROs’ Twitter accounts have thousands of followers. There is a considerable variation among these 
accounts on followers and favourites. For example, @Firewatch_Melb and @Australianwarni accounts, which 
posted the highest number of tweets every month (on average), have 1,014 and 1,704 followers respectively but 
the number of tweets that were declared favorites have been only 15 and 2 respectively. In comparison, 
@CFA_Updates and @MFB_News accounts have attracted a much higher number of followers (51 K and 12.2 K 
respectively), and 550 and 833 tweets respectively have been considered favorite by the people since the activation 
of these accounts. Surprisingly, these results indicate that older Twitter accounts have fewer posts every month 
yet with more favorites compared to the newer accounts, which have a higher number of postings every month (on 
average) but with a lesser number of favorites.  
Table 1. Twitter profile of ERO accounts in Australia by Jan 2015 
User name Twitter join date 
Total # of 
tweets 




@Firewatch_Melb Aug 2012 78.3 K 59 1 K 15 2,610 
@Australianwarni Nov 2011 60.5 K 163 1.7 K 2 1,551 
@CFSAlerts Dec 2010 40.8 K 30 20.3 K 20 816 
@CFSTalk Nov 2011 3.9 K 9 2.5 K 3 100 
@Firewatch_VIC24 Oct 2011 3.7 K 49 144 5 92 
@CFA_Updates Nov 2008 40 K 1082 51 K 550 533 
@Incident_Alert April 2009 17 K 69 6 K 87 293 
@MFB_News Mar 2009 2.5 K 731 12.2 K 833 35 
 
Analysis of the activities of EROs and individual Twitter account holders during the 2014 Victoria fire 
revealed that altogether 2,685 Twitter accounts (users) were involved in disseminating the information by posting 
7,981 tweets during the fire event between the 20th of January to the 14th of February in 2014. This means, on 
average, each account holder posted approximately three tweets in relation to the event. Further analysis into the 
frequency of the tweets, as shown in Table 2, revealed that 1,629 users (20% of all users) had posted single tweet, 
and only 16 users (accounts) posted 40 tweets or more about this event. 
 
5.2 Geo-location information  
Geo-location information referring to street addresses, city names and country names of the tweets, was 
the next valuable information that was retrieved and analysed in this study. Geo-location information generally 
helps EROs and general public to assess their own situation as well as the overall situation in the area during a 
natural hazard (Poblet et al. 2017; Crooks et al. 2013). In addition, it helps authorities and emergency managers to 
assess validity of information posted and also to create virtual communities in order to provide more targeted 
information in the wake of such natural hazards (Vieweg et al. 2010). Geo-location can be identified either if the 
user have directly made it available with the tweets or can be deduced from IP addresses using any of the IP geo-
location solution (Poese et al. 2011; Eriksson et al. 2010).  
In this study, we focused on geo-location information that was provided either directly by the user or 
through the client application. The analysis of the tweets in this study revealed the geo-location information of 
only 846 tweets, which is nearly 11% of the total number of tweets. Out of 846 tweets with available geo-location 
information attached, 52 were from outside Australia. Other tweets were originated within the 40 KM radius of 
the Melbourne City. It is worth mentioning that Firewatch Incident Feeds was a source of 737 tweets out of 846 
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(87.1%) geo-location information enabled tweets. Twitter for iPhone and Android were the source of 52 (6.1%) 
and 30 (3.1%) tweets respectively which was followed by Instagram that sourced 19 (2.2%) tweets. The rest of 
the five sources posted 2 tweets at maximum in relation to this fire hazard. Thus, we did not find a great percentage 
of geo-location enabled tweets in this case study.  Past studies i.e. Krishnamurthy et al. (2008) and Crooks et al. 
(2013), have also found that providing geo-location information is not a common practice in the areas where latest 
mobile technologies are easily and rapidly adopted.  
5.3 Institutional Vs. Non-Institutional Contributions 
Content analysis of tweets collected in this study revealed that 3,579 tweets of the EROs were re-tweeted 
by 444 users between the 7th to 9th of February 2014. These re-tweets were about 45% of the total number of 
tweets, indicating a high level of influence of the institutional EROs on their followers. This is an overwhelming 
result indicating the enthusiasm of the Twitter users in spreading information coming from the EROs. For example, 
53 tweets from @CFA_Updates (which refers to the official page of Victoria fire authority) were re-tweeted 501 
times. The above finding also shows that about 55% of all tweets were from accounts other than EROs.  
Figure 1 illustrates a social network of the re-tweeting behaviour of the users. The nodes of the graph are 
users and a link between each pair of nodes exists if any one of the users has re-tweeted the other user’s tweet. 
The graph shows reputable sources of tweets and further re-tweeting of the tweets from such as CFA_Updates, 
ABCemergency, CFAAlerts and Australianwarni during the Victoria fire event. A closer look into the dense areas 
of the graph revealed that the majority of the tweets from CFA-Updates and Australianwarni went on more than 
six hops in re-tweeting; however tweets from other sources could not go beyond four hops in re-tweeting the 
information from sources such as CFAAlert and ABCemergency. The propagation graph also shows cycles at 
various places indicating that the information was commented, replied and passed on to others.  
 
Figure 1: Re-tweet tree of Victoria bushfire 2014  
Table 2 distinguishes institutional and non-institutional Twitter activities for the top 16 Twitter accounts. 
As this Table shows, about 75% of total tweets have been posted by institutional EROs; however there is a 
considerable variation among the number of tweeting, retweeting and mentioning of these accounts in their tweets. 
For example, @Firewatch_Melb and @Australianwarni were the most active ERO accounts during the event, 
which posted 701 and 260 tweets respectively. On the other side, @MFB_News and @NSWRFS were the least 
active accounts, which posted 50 and 41 tweets during the event. This variation can be explained by the fact that 
since the fire occurred in the outskirts of Melbourne, @Firewatch_Melb and @Australianwarni were the most 
responsible Twitter accounts in spreading fire related information. The @NSWRFS generally covers incidents 
from NSW, Victoria’s neighbour state, and therefore they have been shown less active in relation to the Victoria 
fire.  
Figure 2 also compares the number of ‘Mentions’ for institutional versus non-institutional accounts. As 
a common function in micrblogging services such as Twitter, Mention enables interactive postings by drawing 

















retweeting by them may initiate a large cascade diffusion of the tweet. Mention can help users to improve the 
visibility of their tweets and expand their horizon of social interaction beyond their immediate reach (Wang et al. 
2013). As an important interactive behaviour, Mention allows to actively direct a tweet to target users using the 
form of @username (Simon et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2013). Mentioning others in the tweets can also be viewed as 
an efficient way to pull (i.e. to initiate and encourage) interactions instead of push (i.e. visible only if you follow 
with passive responses). Therefore, instead of waiting passively for retweets after postings, Mention can actively 
initiate interactions at the time of the postings (Tang et al. 2015; Duan et al. 2010). Amongst all, three accounts 
had the highest number of Mentions: @CFSAlerts, @CFSAlerts, and @geehall, two of which are EROs and one 
is a digital volunteer. However, as Figure 2 shows, the total number of institutional Mentions is significantly higher 
than those of non-institutional ones. This finding suggests that (i) people affected by this disaster have been and 
aware of EROs’ Twitter account names and have actually used the information posted by these organizations, and 
(ii) they trusted the information posted by EROs since they mentioned EROs account names in their following 
tweets or re-tweets.     
 
 
Figure 2: institutional vs. non-institutional information dissemination contributions 
On the other hand, non-institutional actors have also played a significant role in information 
dissemination, with about 25% of all tweets were posted by them. As Figure 2 shows, while the total of number 
of tweets posted by non-institutional is less than EROs, the level of their re-tweets is significantly higher. This has 
important implications, as it reflects the community members’ strong willingness to trust and share active 
individual Twitter account holders/social influencers’ messages during a natural disaster. This is consistent with 
findings of other studies, as for example Cha et al. (2010) found that a high percentage of re-tweeting of tweets is 
an indicator of the level of influence of the users (who posted the messages) on their followers. In other words, the 
followers consider such a user a trusted source and regard the information posted by them valuable, notable and 
informative (Hughes and Palen 2009) 
 
Table 2: Tweeting, Re-tweeting and Mentioning of Twitter accounts with over 40 posts 
Communities 

















@Firewatch_Melb Local Fire authority 701 0% (0) 6 
@Australianwarni Fire authority  260 15% (40) 40 
@incident_alert Local fire alert 170 197% (335) 156 
@CFSTalk SA country fire services 97 30% (30) 57 
@CFSAlerts SA country fire services 88 165% (146) 152 
@firewatch_VIC24 Local Fire alert authority  54 16% (9) 3 
@greatozgovtweet Aus govt SM messages 54 1131% 
(611) 
4 
@IncidentAlert16 Fire authority 51 0% (0)  25 
@MFB_News Fire authority 50 42% (21) 36 
@NSWRFS NSW Govt fire authority  41 39% (16) 37 




@geehall1 Social media volunteer 240 211% (507) 135 

















@VicStormChasers Severe weather specialist for 
Victorians  
96 494% (475) 0 
@neighbourday 
 






Table 2 also shows a considerable variation among institutions’ number of tweets and their re-tweets. 
While some EROs’ tweets have achieved a higher level of re-tweets, others have performed the quiet opposite. 
For the example, tweets from @Firewatch_Melb were never retweeted by the other accounts. The tweets from 
@Australianwarni were retweeted only 40 times in relation to this fire, which is a small percentage (15%) of the 
total number of tweets posted by that account. Interestingly, 170 tweets from @incident_alert, were retweeted 335 
times (197% of the total number of tweets). The @geatozgovtweet was one of the least active accounts (in terms 
of the number of posts) during the event, yet 54 of their tweets were retweeted 611 times, achieving the highest 
percentage (1131%) in retweeting. Similar observations have been made for the other less active accounts. For 
example, 88 tweets from CFSAlerts were retweeted 146 times achieving a high percentage in retweeting frequency 
(165%). The least active accounts such as @MFB_News and @NSWRFS have also shown a relatively high 
frequency rate (42% and 39% respectively) for retweeting.  
Furthermore, we found that the content of the tweets as well as the hashtags that EROs used played an 
important role in the total number of re-tweets. This means that tweets posted by government emergency 
organisations who covered the event from various perspectives and posted relevant contents were very attractive 
to community members. Also tweets from more appropriate hashtages have been retweeted more than the others. 
Similar observation has been made for the mentioning of the accounts. Similar to the pattern of re-tweeting, 
mentioning of very active accounts was less for the less active accounts as shown in Table 2. For example, 
@firewatch_Melb and @Australianwarni accounts that had tweeted 701 and 260 times were mentioned 85% and 
15% respectively. Some of the medium level active accounts such as @incident_alert, @CFStalks and @CFSalerts 
have been mentioned at a high rate of 91%, 58% and 172% respectively against their total number of tweets. Less 
active accounts such as @incident_alert16, @MFB_News and @NSWRFS have been mentioned at considerable 
rates, 49%, 72% and 90% respectively in the tweets from other accounts. The variation in tweeting, re-tweeting 
and mentioning of ERO accounts can be due to various reasons. For example, since the fire occurred in the outskirts 
of Melbourne, @firewatch_Melb disseminated information more than the other ERO accounts. However, this does 
not mean that this account achieved a high number of retweeting and mentioning in the tweets from other people. 
Joining Twitter early in 2008 and 2009 and building trust among the communities can be among the reasons for 
some ERO accounts such as @CFA_updates, @incident_alert and @MFB_News to have their posts retweeted 
and mentioned more frequently than others.   
In addition to some EROs, social media influencers, volunteers, and general public supporting 
communities also remained active on Twitter throughout the event. Our results revealed that these individual 
Twitter account holders have played a crucial role in the development of informed communities. For example, 
@geehall1 (a volunteer) tweeted that “Murray Valley Hwy Ebden (11) and Huon (2 vehicles), NOT Yet Under 
Control”, which was later twitter by @ABCemergency, a TV media outlet, about the situation in the following 
way “Halls Gap #VIC residents advised to leave their homes ahead of wind change today”. Our findings indicate 
that re-tweeting and mentioning of their postings have been highly frequent by the concerned communities because 
of the coverage of the event at a wider level and using appropriate hashtags related to the event. 
 
5.4 Tweet contents: informative rather than directive  
Altogether 1,566 tweets were posted by the selected 16 accounts in Table 2. The majority of the tweets, 
particularly from EROs, explain the situation and what is happening on the ground. For example, @CFA_updates 
tweeted stating that “@theheraldsun: #VICFires: It's not over yet. #Melbourne wakes to smell of smoke as fires 
continue”. Another tweet from @CFA-Updates informed the communities as “North Warrandyte fires now marked 
as under control - great work by local crews. Warning will be updated shortly #vicfires”. 
However, such tweets were informative rather than directive. They did not provide directions in terms of 
what needs to be done in a particular situation for the safety of individuals and community members. Analysis of 
tweets revealed that the general public had shown their concern over the provision of limited information by the 
EROs. For example, a tweet from a citizen states that “It's scary when a cop knocks on your door &amp; says 
"Fires are bad. You better pack your stuff &amp; leave". Another citizen tweeted stating that “No luck escaping 
the smoke from #vicfires Still horrible here. #whereamiworking Phillip Island.”  
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A relatively high number of Mentions in Table 2 suggest that there is a considerable potential for the 
public to receive more directive information and guidance. Particularly, EROs have emphasised on the use of 
appropriate #tags for streamlining the spreading of the fire related information. For example, one of the tweets 
posted by CFA_Updates is “@rexster: To all Vic tweeters, the #tag being used by @CFA_Updates and others is 
#firevic not #vicfires pls RT and use for bushfire tweet”. In this tweet, they appear to be instructing the Victorian 
public to retweet their postings with hashtag #firevic not #vicfires. Our findings show that determining an 
appropriate hashtag for the fire incident was challenging for the public. Analysis of the data also reveals that 
numerous hashtags were used in communicating this fire event, which can be categorised into three groups: the 
general level, state level, and local level. The most used general level hashtags to represent this fire event were 
#bushfire, #firewatch and #bush. However, the state level hashtags included #vicfires, #firevic and #victoria. These 
hashtags (general and state levels) existed and used on twitter prior to this event. People used hashtags such as 
#southmelbourne, #campbelfield, #fishermansbend, #epping, #Oakpark and many others referring to the status of 
the fire at the local level. Thus, the communities used a variety of hashtags on twitter in relation to this fire. 
However, fire authorities preferred using #firevic and requested people to use this hashtag in their postings in 
relation to the fire event.   
6. DISCUSSION 
6.1 Disaster Information Dissemination Power Share 
Findings of this study revealed that while several Australian EROs have well-established twitter accounts 
and actively use them during disasters, a large portion of news dissemination activities on social media happens 
through non-institutional outlets and individual twitter account holders. This challenges traditional assumptions of 
the theories like World System Theory that assume information flows from large news outlets to smaller units. As 
shown in Figure 3, we propose a power share between institutional and non-institutional social media outlets 
during disaster events, which in turn calls for a more effective coordination between institutional (i.e. large 
organizations) and non-institutional (i.e. digital volunteers). Re-tweeting 45% of the tweets by EROs indicate that 
EROs had strong influence on their followers during the event and that the followers listened the instructions by 
the trustworthy EROs and re-tweeted the information, which went on many hops creating a social network analysis, 
as shown in Table 2. However, the power of non-institutional and digital volunteers becomes more apparent when 
the number of re-tweets for non-institutional and institutional accounts are compared for the 2014 Victorian bush 
fire. As shown in Figure 2, total of number of tweets by EROs are clearly more than the tweets from non-
institutional account holders, whereas they are quite the opposite in re-tweeting.  
 
 
Figure 3: Disaster information dissemination power share 
On the one hand, the results of this study confirm that that the role of EROs is critical in leading the 
communication among various stakeholders during natural disasters. While social media typically has the organic, 
groundswell stereotype as it relates to content generation and dissemination (Crooks et al. 2013; Vieweg et al. 
2010), we found that formal institutions and hierarchies appear to maintain a sense of credibility and trust when 
social media users are searching for information concerning their personal safety during disasters. As Table 1 
indicates, Australian EROs have overwhelmingly realised the importance of establishing Twitter accounts, and 
that the newer ERO accounts are more active than the older ones in posting messages during natural hazards. The 
results provided in Table 1 also suggest that the older accounts have a greater number of followers and favourites 
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for their postings, which may mean an early embark on twitter has helped some EROs to win the trust of the 
communities over newer EROs. With more than 2.8 million active users (to date) in Australia, presence on Twitter 
platform has essentially become a need for EROs to communicate with the communities during natural 
disasters/hazards (Sinnappan et al. 2010).  
On the other hand, the findings of this study also revealed that almost 50% of all messages exchanged on 
Twitter about 2014 Victorian bush fire were initiated by non-EROs and non-institutional account holders. This is 
consistent with some other studies in the literature suggesting that the general public is the main player in 
communicating the events related information on social media (Vieweg et al. 2010; Oh et al. 2013; Simon et al. 
2014). As table 2 presents, accounts such as @geehall1 and @neighbourday are volunteers, actively posted 
information about this event, and also had their posts re-twitted on a very large scale. Digital volunteering is a 
recognized phenomenon in the context of social media. Starbird et al. (2011) considers digital volunteers 
individuals or groups who predominantly monitor incoming digital feeds to find new, relevant, and actionable 
information (Zao et al. 2011). Cobb et al. (2014) have recognized the importance of processing real-time and first-
hand information from the members of a disaster-affected-community for a better decision making and designing 
strategies. Digital volunteers often work to treat the social media data into useable resources. Cobbs et al. (2014) 
conducted contextual interview with digital volunteers and emergency managers to provide insights into their 
collaboration and the use of tools for monitoring disasters. The results of their study highlight the importance of 
digital volunteers’ impact on design implications of support systems that are used in coordinating and integrating 
disaster management activities. 
6.2 Institutional/non-institutional coordination for information dissemination  
Further analysis of the tweet data indicated that there was peak and off peak time of the tweets by EROs. 
There were hours of the day when more than 150 tweets were posted whereas in other hours only a couple tweets 
were posted about the event. This great variation in the frequency of tweets indicates that EROs may not have 
allocated sufficient resources to conduct consistent communication around the clock. Extremely low tweeting rates 
in particular hours, or in other words less activeness from EROs in particular hours could have created 
opportunities for people to spread suspicious information or rumours (Oh et al. 2013).  Therefore, EROs need to 
take an active role in consistent communication with the disaster affected community as well as with active digital 
volunteers that post and share disaster information on social media. This specially becomes important, as a 
relatively higher number of Mentions suggest that people trust the information posted by EROs, take appropriate 
actions accordingly, and forward the corresponding messages to other affected people in the community. 
Furthermore, the contents of most postings were informative rather directive for the affected communities. 
This means tweet posts were mainly about updating the communities about the fire situation on the ground, and 
less about directing the community members with what actions they need to perform for their safety. Safety of the 
communities is the mission of Australian EROs and how social media can be used to support the safety of the 
communities is still a challenging task for the EROs (Crooks et al. 2013). Our findings suggest that pointing to 
useful resources under a particular event condition can be helpful for the communities to enhance their safety. To 
point to the right resource promptly, EROs might have to establish communication links with other support 
agencies such as Red Cross and Salvation Army during the disasters as well as active digital volunteers/Twitter 
influencers. 
The above finding becomes especially important as the information posted by the non-institutional and 
individual Twitter accounts may sometimes be unreliable, leading to rumours among the communities (Popoola 
2013). Rumours and suspicious information can be neutralised if EROs play an active role on social media during 
extreme events. It is evident from the results of this study that the active role played by the EROs during the 
Victorian fire event had helped to build public trust on EROs. The information that came from EROs on the fire 
event was spread by the public based on instructions provided by the EROs. Thus, development of a closer and 
more trustful communication system between the EROs and active Twitter influencers can significantly help to 
reduce rumours about the event. 
 
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that has distinguished the use of Twitter by formal 
institutions (e.g. Australian EROs) from non-institutional (e.g. digital volunteers) during a natural disaster. This 
study primarily analysed the services provided by major Australian EROs as well as active individual account 
holders through a social media platform, Twitter, during a fire event in 2014.  
The results of this study showed EROs’ strong and active presence at social media, particularly at Twitter. 
This has helped them to play a leading role in communicating with their followers on the fire event, which has 
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been evidenced by a high level of posted tweets. In comparison, non-institutional account holders have often 
posted a larger number of shares and re-tweets than EROs. This in turn reveals the high influence that non-
institutional channels play in disaster information dissemination during a natural event. Thus, future research is 
needed to further examine frameworks or mechanism for a more effective coordination or collaboration between 
institutional versus non-institutional social media accounts for dissemination of disaster information. Moreover, 
future studies should investigate why non-institutional messages may get more viral than some EROs. Research 
is needed into understanding factors that may influence share-ability of institutional vs non-institutional warnings 
during a disaster.  
Another important result of this study was that the ERO’s tweets were primarily used to inform affected 
people about the status of the disaster rather directing them to take particular actions, even when such tweets came 
from institutions invested with the power to direct. This could be because EORs may consider Twitter as a tool 
for information dissemination than a channel for giving specific directions to the people who may need different 
advice in different circumstances. However, past studies in the use of social media in natural disasters have 
emphasized on the potentials of Twitter and social media for supporting official communications and reflecting 
ground level conditions (Sinnappan et al. 2010).  Thus, future research is needed to investigate on EROs’ 
perception and intention of using social media channels, and Twitter in particular, during disasters, and what 
protocols they may or may not have for using these tools for the purpose of providing directions and official advice.  
Furthermore, while social media platforms work very well in broadcasting trustworthy information 
(Erfani et al., 2017), they are also effective in spreading baseless rumours which can contribute to the chaos in the 
affected areas (Mendoza et al. 2010). Yates and Paquette (2011) have questioned the credibility of some social 
media feeds during natural disasters. They argue that during a natural disaster and when information from official 
sources is scarce, rumours can be spread on social media contributing to the chaos on the ground. Popoola (2013) 
discussed that users generally have difficulty discerning truthfulness of tweets based on their contents. To develop 
a deeper understanding of the difference between valid news and rumours, Mendoza et al (2010) collected 
4,727,524 tweets on Chilean earthquake from February 27 to March 2 in 2010 and conducted two studies to 
investigate (i) how the news and rumours propagate through networks, and (ii) the ability of the network to 
discriminate between false rumours and confirmed news. Their results postulated that the propagation of tweets 
that correspond to rumours differs from tweets that spread news in a way that false rumours are questioned much 
more than the confirmed truths by the users (also see Popoola (2013)). From this perspective, it appears that non-
institutional and less formal Twitter account holders may act as a collaborative filter of information that does not 
allow rumours to penetrate deep in the social graph. Future research is therefore needed to deepen our 
understanding on how to distinguish rumours from trustworthy news during a disaster, and that how institutional 
and non-institutional people can work together to avoid or control spreading false information into the community. 
More research is also needed to study the integration of general public’s tweets into institutional 
applications, which in turn may drive innovation in services and communication with the public. Rosenberger et 
al. (2016) investigated the use of social media platforms such as Twitter by institutional organizations, and found 
that linking such platforms with their internal business applications can lead to various benefits, including 
transparency in actions, improving citizens’ public participation, and improvement in services.  
Lastly, our findings showed that while most of EROs and active digital volunteers posted geo-enabled 
tweets, only a small percentage of general public shared geo-enabled tweets. For example, Firewatch Incident 
Feed alone was the source of 87.1% of the geo-enabled tweets. With respect to the general public, the results are 
consistent with the results of past studies on geo-location such as Crooks et al. (2013) and Krishnamurthy et al. 
(2008) suggest that general public does not consider posting geo-enabled tweets during extreme events. Geo-
location information referring to street addresses, city names and country names of the tweets is a valuable 
information for EROs and general public to assess their own situation as well as the overall situation in the area 
during a natural disaster/hazard (Crooks et al. 2013). In addition, it helps EROs to create virtual communities in 
order to provide more targeted information in the wake of such events (Vieweg et al. 2010). Further research is 
thus needed to investigate whether and how users can be motivated for using using geo-location enabled tweets 
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